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ABSTRACT  
Competing accounts of the effect of globalization on labor politics agree that firms influence 
regulations, but make contrasting predictions for which firms are most likely to oppose 
regulations.  Using survey data from employers in 19,000 manufacturing firms in 82 developing 
countries, we examine the determinants of employers’ opinions towards labor regulation.  In 
contrast to the predictions of optimistic theories of globalization, we find that (1) firms that 
export are more likely to have negative opinions towards labor regulation than those that sell 
domestically, and (2) firms that receive foreign direct investment have similar views as firms that 
rely only on domestic capital.  Further, we show that systematic differences in employers’ 
opinions depend on the intensity of the competitive pressures they face and their use of skilled 
workers. In doing so, we provide an empirically grounded account of the heterogeneous opinions 
of key actors in economic policy-making in developing countries. 
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In developing countries, firms have substantial influence over labor regulations.  They 
often lobby governments directly to obtain regulations that advance their interests (Frundt, 1998; 
Cook, 2010; Caraway, 2004; Murillo, 2005; Kuruvilla, Lee, & Gallagher, 2011; Berliner, 
Greenleaf, Lake, & Noveck, 2015b). Even when firms do not actively seek to influence 
regulations they have structural power, as politicians anticipate employers’ needs and adjust 
regulations to attract investment (Haggard, Maxfield, & Schneider, 1997; Fairfield 2015). 
Despite a widely held agreement that the preferences of firms affect labor regulations, 
researchers have not analyzed how developing country employers view their own interests. In 
this paper, we ask: Which employers hold a negative opinion towards labor regulations in 
developing countries?  
We organize our analysis around the competing answers to this question that derive from 
debates over the effects of globalization, which has created novel pressures and opportunities for 
firms across a range of regulatory domains, including not only labor (Schrank 2013; Toffel, 
Short and Ouellet 2015; Mosley 2017) but also the environment, human rights, finance, 
telecommunications, intellectual property, taxation, food safety, and others (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000). In all these domains, firms play a critical role in influencing the types of 
regulatory policies countries adopt and how they are implemented. In labor politics, some 
accounts of globalization suggest that employers exposed to foreign trade and footloose capital 
have negative views of labor regulations because these firms seek to minimize labor costs (Chan 
& Ross, 2003, Merk, 2014).  Others, however, disagree, and challenge the view that global 
economic integration leads employers to resist labor regulations (Flanagan, 2006; Neumayer & 
De Soysa, 2006).  Instead, they hold that developing country firms that receive foreign direct 
investment (FDI) may urge host governments to protect workers (Mosley & Uno, 2007; Mosley, 
2010). Studies also suggest that firms that export are more likely to adopt employment practices 
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that align with the requirements of minimum labor standards (Flanagan, 2006).  They predict that 
developing country employers exposed to globalization should be less inclined to oppose 
regulations. Thus, competing accounts make conflicting predictions vis-à-vis employers’ 
opinions towards regulation, and empirical studies have not examined which predictions are 
correct. Are firms that engage most directly in the global economy, either because they export 
their goods or receive FDI, more or less likely to see labor regulations as an obstacle?  
One reason why these theories make different predictions is that FDI and trade trigger 
mechanisms that can foster both negative and positive opinions towards regulation. On the one 
hand, firms that export or depend on foreign capital can face intense pressures from market 
competition that might compel managers to minimize labor costs in ways that conflict with the 
requirements of labor laws.  On the other hand, these firms also tend to adopt production systems 
that require the use of skilled workers, who often command higher wages and better working 
conditions.  Moreover, employers depending on skill-intensive production systems are often 
more interested in raising labor productivity than minimizing labor costs.  As a result, these firms 
may be disinclined to engage in employment practices that conflict with the requirements of 
labor regulations, making opposition to regulations unlikely.  Thus, existing theories that connect 
globalization to labor politics in developing countries through firm-level action are constructed 
upon two firm-level mechanisms, namely (1) intensity of competition, which is associated with 
increased antipathy towards labor regulation and (2) adoption of skill-intensive production 
systems, which is associated with sympathy or indifference towards labor regulation, but these 
theories disagree on whether globalization favors the former or the latter.  
These mechanisms build upon a related literature on advanced industrial countries that 
provides accounts for variation in firm preferences for labor regulation—for example, by 
pointing to the importance of employing skilled workers in shaping firm preferences for 
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regulation (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001; Wood, 2001; Martin, 2005; Swenson, 
1991; Mares, 2003).  Yet, scholars have not directly examined whether these theories can indeed 
be extended to developing countries, which have economic and political characteristics that 
clearly place them outside of this literature’s scope conditions (Schneider 2013).  For instance, if 
labor laws go unenforced, as they often do in much of the developing world, we may not observe 
any difference in opinion among employers with varying characteristics.2 Are the opinions of 
employers in developing countries towards labor regulation sensitive to the intensity of 
competitive pressures they face?  Do employer opinions depend on their firms’ production 
systems, especially those that require skilled workers?  
The lack of answers to fundamental questions about developing country employers’ 
opinions in the literature has not been due to an absence of theoretical import, but rather to 
empirical limitations.  Indeed, dominant theories highlight the ways by which economic forces 
lead firms to develop an interest in regulatory policies that support their competitive position, 
and that these interests become reflected in policy because politicians respond to the needs of 
capital.  Yet, cross-national quantitative studies of labor politics in developing countries often 
rely on country-level datasets unfit for testing firm-level predictions.  The literature is 
characterized by what Mosley and Singer (2015 p. 290) call “a disjuncture between the level of 
analysis of the causal mechanisms, on the one hand, and the level of analysis of the data, on the 
other” (see also Berliner, Greenleaf, Lake, Levi, & Noveck, 2015b).  In this paper, we bridge this 
disjuncture by using micro-level data from a World Bank survey of approximately 19,000 
                                                
 
2 Similarly, developing country employers may object to labor regulations not because of the burdens of compliance 
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employers in formal manufacturing establishments located in 82 developing countries (an 
establishment is a stand-alone subunit of a firm).  The survey asks employers whether labor 
regulations are an obstacle for the operations of their establishment.  Responses to this question 
provide a direct measure of employers’ opinion of de facto labor regulation. 
Analyzing these data, we find that employers in manufacturing establishments that export 
are more likely to have a negative opinion of labor regulation than those that sell to domestic 
markets.  Furthermore, we do not find evidence that establishments that receive foreign direct 
investment have a more positive opinion of labor regulation.  These results are incongruent with 
the view that developing country subsidiaries of multinationals urge their host governments to 
strengthen labor regulations (Mosley, 2010, p. 53) and that exporters and foreign firms easily 
comply with regulations due to their superior labor practices (Flanagan, 2006; Neumayer & De 
Soysa, 2006).   While our empirical analysis is not designed to determine whether there is a race 
to the top or bottom, we contribute to these debates by showing evidence that is more consistent 
with the microfoundations of the pessimistic accounts. To be clear, we are not arguing that 
“climb to the top” accounts are wrong in their predictions regarding national-level outcomes (we 
do not test those predictions); rather, we show that the firm-level mechanisms that these theories 
contend explain such outcomes are not supported by the evidence. 
We extend this analysis by testing the two factors that the literature theorizes underlie 
employer opinions, i.e. competitive pressures and reliance on a skilled workforce.   We 
investigate competitive pressures in two ways.  First, we analyze the difference in opinion among 
employers whose establishments sell their output in the same municipality where they are 
located and, therefore, face moderate competitive pressures, with those that sell in national or 
international markets, and thus are more likely to face intense competitive pressures. We find 
that employers whose firms sell mainly in less competitive local markets have a more positive 
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opinion of labor regulation.  Second, we use exposure to competition arising from the informal 
sector as an additional measure of competitive pressure.  While all firms in our sample are 
formal, they face different types of domestic competitors; some compete exclusively against 
other formal firms, but others also compete against firms that flout basic regulatory requirements 
(i.e. informal sector).  This measure parallels the undercutting competition that exporters face 
from countries with lax regulatory requirements.  We find that formal that compete against 
informal ones are substantially more likely to have a negative opinion of labor regulations, 
providing further evidence that competitive pressure underlies opposition to labor regulation.  
Finally, we investigate variation in productive systems by focusing on skilled workers. We find 
that establishments that employ a higher proportion of skilled workers are indeed less likely to 
have a negative opinion of labor regulation.  Those who argue that labor practices and 
regulations can improve under globalization appear to be correct in one key way, as reliance on 
skill-intensive production systems is associated with more positive opinions towards labor 
regulation.  
This paper opens up a new dimension in the study of regulatory politics in developing 
countries by directly investigating the views of managers within firms.  Many recent studies 
analyze public opinion towards economic policy, trade, and FDI in developing countries (e.g. 
Baker, 2005, Pandya, 2010, Carnes & Mares, 2013).  Such research is key to determining 
whether theoretical accounts of policy-making match actors’ understandings of their own 
interests.  Although scholars have long recognized that firms, and the managers who direct them, 
play an important role in the politics of a variety of policy domains, few have examined the 
preferences of developing country firms.  This oversight is surprising given that the study of firm 
influence on policy in advanced industry countries has involved an extensive and fruitful debate 
over the complex nature of firm preferences (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001; Wood, 
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2001; Martin, 2005; Swenson, 1991; Mares, 2003). While we focus on labor regulation, the 
factors that we explore—trade, FDI, intensity of competition, and firm capabilities—are central 
to a wide range of regulatory domains, including the environment, product standards, taxation, 
food safety, and more (Garcia-Johnson 2000; Bull 2007; Genschel & Schwarz 2011; Perez-
Aleman 2013; Cashore & Stone 2014; Nadvi & Raj-Reichert 2015).  By uncovering the 
underpinnings of managers’ opinions, we contribute to the construction of more complete 
theories of regulatory politics in developing countries.  
GLOBALIZATION AND EMPLOYERS’ OPINIONS 
 Theoretical accounts of the effect of globalization on labor politics in developing 
countries point to a number of pathways through which global integration can influence 
regulations and practices—some pathways involve relations between states, some involve 
international organizations (Anner & Caraway, 2010), and still others involve firms and their 
influence on policy.  We focus on the firm-based pathways.  Employers influence labor 
regulation in two ways.  First, when employers find regulations to be an obstacle, they lobby 
politicians to gain regulatory policies that they prefer, as has been shown repeatedly in 
developing countries (Frundt 1998; Cook, 2010; Caraway, 2004; Murillo, 2005; Kuruvilla, Lee, 
& Gallagher, 2011).  Second, firms allocate investment and production across jurisdictions, 
allowing them to penalize or reward localities that adopt regulatory policies that they perceive to 
contravene or advance their interests (Fairfield, 2015). Crucially, this structural power does not 
depend on direct lobbying for desired policies—politicians may seek to attract and retain 
investment by catering to the (perceived) desires of management, whether firms are interested in 
stronger or weaker regulations (Vogel, 1995).  While there are debates regarding the precise 
conditions under which employers are most influential, there is consensus that their preferences 
matter tremendously.  Yet, dominant theories of labor politics make untested, and contradictory, 
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predictions about employers’ opinions of labor regulation. In this section, we outline these 
predictions regarding the two components of global economic integration that have been central 
to the literature, trade and FDI. 
 We organize our discussion around the contrast between globalization “optimists” and 
“pessimists.”  Although these terms are normatively inflected, they provide a useful shorthand to 
organize the literature. On one side, globalization pessimists argue that trade exposes firms to 
more intense competition, which forces them to minimize labor costs. According to this view, 
employers that export resent labor regulations, and politicians respond by eliminating (or failing 
to enforce) these regulations (Chan & Ross, 2003).  Consistent with this view, studies have 
shown that that trade weakens collective labor rights (Mosley, 2010) and that countries that are 
more open to trade tend to neglect to enforce labor regulations (Madrid, 2003; Caraway, 2004; 
Cook, 2010, Stallings, 2010, Ronconi, 2012).  The underlying firm-level mechanism theorized 
by pessimists is straightforward: 1) firms that export face intense price competition, often from 
firms located in countries with lax regulations; 2) pressured to reduce labor costs, they seek to 
adopt production and employment practices - such as excess overtime or extensive use of 
temporary workers - that conflict with the requirements of regulations; 3) due to discord between 
employers’ views of their material interests and what regulations require of them, they form a 
negative opinion of labor regulations. By contrast, firms that produce for domestic markets, 
especially those that are protected from imports, face less competition and are more likely to 
operate on a level regulatory playing field.  In sum, the pessimistic view leads to the prediction 
that firms that export are more likely to have a negative opinion of labor regulations than firms 
that do not export.  
On the other side, globalization optimists have challenged the view that trade exerts 
downward pressures on labor practices that could lead employers to hold a negative opinion 
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towards labor regulation (Drezner, 2001).3  These accounts tend to focus on the greater 
capabilities of exporting firms. In fact, a large literature shows that exporting firms tend to have 
higher productivity and pay higher wages than non-exporters (Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Schank, 
Thorsten, Schnabel, & Wagner, 2007). Drawing on this literature, optimistic accounts claim that 
exporting firms “offer…working conditions that are superior” to domestic firms (Flanagan 2006 
p. 67). Similarly, scholars argue that “wages and labor standards tend to be higher in export-
oriented sectors in developing countries” and that “higher labor standards in these [export 
oriented] companies are likely to be seen [by management] as necessary to produce products 
efficiently” (Neumayer & De Soysa, 2006, p. 35).  In brief, trade optimists point out that 
exporters often devote more effort towards improving labor productivity than reducing labor 
costs. For this reason, firms that export are more likely to rely on skilled workers who command 
higher salaries and better working conditions, and thus they are unlikely to see labor regulations 
as an obstacle. 
Global economic integration entails not only trade but also foreign direct investment 
(FDI), an equity investment by individuals or companies from one country in a firm operating in 
another country.  Once again, pessimistic and optimistic accounts disagree on the effects of FDI 
on host-country employers’ opinions.  Pessimistic arguments hold that foreign investors are 
fickle and ready to sell their stakes in any one location so they can move their capital to other 
countries that promise lower production costs and higher returns.  Merk (2014), for example, 
                                                
 
3  Two papers have argued that the effects of trade on labor rights are contingent on trading partners (Greenhill et al., 
2009; Adolph Quince & Prakash, 2017).  Because of data limitations, we can only test the hypotheses implied by 
these theories on a subsample of employers from Latin America in 2006.  Our analysis, reported on Table A9 of the 
Appendix, shows results congruent with our main findings. 
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finds that large multinational apparel manufacturers, many of them headquartered in Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong, locate subsidiaries throughout Asia and Latin America and use the 
threat of relocation to press for lenient labor regulations. Congruent with this case study research, 
Payton & Woo (2014) present a formal model and quantitative evidence showing that FDI is 
attracted to countries with weaker labor laws.4  According to this view, firms that receive FDI 
strive to reduce their production costs, including labor costs, to please their foreign investors. 
Their labor cost-reduction efforts increase the likelihood that plant-level managers will seek 
employment practices that conflict with labor regulations.  Thus, just as with the trade 
pessimists, the key mechanism in these theories is competitive pressure, which leads employers 
in firms that receive FDI to be more likely to perceive labor regulations as an obstacle.5  
Not all agree that employers in foreign-invested firms hold negative opinions of labor 
regulations that would serve as the basis of actions that erode labor law.  Rather, cross-national 
studies find that FDI has a positive impact on collective labor laws and rights (Mosley & Uno, 
2007; Mosley, 2010).  Optimistic theories hold that firms play a key role in making inflows of 
FDI translate into stronger labor practices and regulations for many of the same reasons as the 
trade optimists.  Foreign firms are understood to be more productive, demand higher skilled 
labor, and pay higher wages than their domestic counterparts (Pandya, 2010). As foreign 
                                                
 
4 They also argue, however, that once investments are made, governments may have incentives to improve 
enforcement.  Note also that this theory focuses on the decisions of investors, rather than managers in the host 
countries. It may be that investors seek countries with weaker labor laws but that managers in the host-country are 
supportive of regulatory policies.  
5 Pessimists also point out that foreign firms rarely diffuse production practices that entail the use of more skilled 
workers, as is sometimes suggested by optimistic theories of globalization.  For example, foreign-owned firms in 
Lesotho’s garment industry did not adopt production systems that require worker training beyond the lowest levels 
of skills (Lall 2005). 
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investors are attracted to locations with skilled workers (as opposed to lower labor costs), they 
tend to support workers’ rights because rights “enhance […] the opportunity for the host 
country’s citizenry to attain higher levels of education and training” (Blanton & Blanton 2007, p. 
146).  Similarly, Mosley and Uno (2007, p. 925) argue that local subsidiaries of foreign firms 
“urge governments directly to improve the rule of law, [and] protect the vulnerable.” Mosley and 
Uno also suggest that multinationals “bring the best practices for workers’ rights to host 
countries,” which enhances their capabilities and drives laws and practices upwards (p. 925).  
Additionally, Mosley (2010, p. 53) argues that foreign-owned firms “are competing with local 
firms to hire skilled workers” and “may want to avoid the competitive disadvantage that would 
result from a reputation for repressing labor rights.”  Furthermore, “even in sectors with mostly 
unskilled workers, many [foreign] firms may believe that workers whose core rights are 
protected (and whose working conditions meet minimum standards) are more likely to remain on 
the job and work efficiently” (p. 54).  Thus, the explanation for why FDI is associated with 
stronger regulatory protections implies that, all else equal, employers in foreign-invested firms 
should view labor regulations more favorably than counterparts in firms owned exclusively by 
domestic investors.6  Just like the trade optimists, FDI optimists argue that foreign-invested firms 
put more emphasis on increasing workers’ productivity rather than minimizing labor costs. This 
emphasis reduces conflict between the interests of the firm and the mandates of regulation, and 
thus increases managers’ acceptance of labor regulations.  
                                                
 
6 These theories also suggest that managers in “home countries” (i.e. those where capital originates) may also have 
more positive views towards labor regulation, but we do not empirically examine these actors and instead focus on 
the host-country employers. 
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 In sum, the literature on globalization suggests two sets of competing hypotheses 
pertaining to employers’ opinion towards labor regulations:  
H1: All else equal, employers in firms that export (sell to the domestic market) are more 
likely to have a negative (positive) opinion of labor regulations. 
 
H2: All else equal, employers in firms that receive FDI (domestically-owned firms) are 
more likely to have negative (positive) opinion of labor regulations. 
 
To be clear, testing these hypotheses will not resolve the debate between pessimists (i.e. “race to 
the bottom”) and optimists (i.e. “climb to the top”).  Rather, our hypotheses address one 
particular pathway or mechanism through which trade and FDI can influence domestic politics: 
through the opinions of employers.  This pathway is important because firm preferences are 
central to all of the above theories—we cannot expect that firms urge governments to enact or 
enforce more protective regulations if they have a negative opinion towards regulation, just as 
we would not expect firms to undermine regulations if they have a positive or neutral opinion of 
them.  
COMPETITION AND SKILLS 
Both optimistic and pessimistic theories of globalization and labor politics in developing 
countries rely on a shared understanding that employers’ preferences for labor regulation derive, 
in part, from 1) their exposure to competitive pressures and 2) the relationship between the 
particular production systems they use, such as those that require skilled workers, and the 
requirements of labor regulations. Thus, while scholars disagree on the consequences of trade 
and FDI for labor politics, they implicitly accept that these two forces underlie differences in 
employers’ preferences.  Although there have been studies of firm preferences in Europe and 
United States, we are not aware of studies that empirically substantiate the mechanisms implied 
by these theories in developing countries that clearly lie outside of their scope conditions. Thus, 
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we ask: in developing countries, are employers who face more intense competitive pressures 
more likely to have a negative opinion of labor regulation?  And are employers in firms that 
adopt production systems that require the use of skilled workers less likely to have a negative 
opinion of labor regulation?   
First, as described above, the theories tying globalization to employer antipathy for labor 
regulations emphasize the pressures from intense competition. Quite simply, firms exposed to 
more intense competition are motivated to reduce costs, including those associated with labor, 
and as a result their employers are more likely to have a negative view of labor regulations that 
infringe on their abilities to cut labor costs.  While globalization pessimists focus on variation in 
competitive pressures due to trade and FDI, competitive pressures can arise from a wider variety 
of sources that, if this theory is correct, should also influence employers’ views.  Ideally, 
intensity of competition should be measured through the number of competitors a firm faces in a 
given market, as well as their average productivity. This type of data rarely exists for large 
samples of firms in developing countries, so we must look for proxies.  One such proxy for the 
intensity of competition used by trade economists is the size of the market in which a firm 
competes; as Melitz and Ottaviano argue, both “market size and trade affect the toughness of 
competition” (2008, p 295).  The logic is the following: just as the international market harbors a 
larger population of very productive firms than national markets, larger national markets also 
harbor a larger population of very productive firms than smaller subnational markets.  If the 
intensity of competition varies with the size of the market in which a firm competes, those firms 
that compete for customers mainly in subnational markets will be - on average and all else equal 
- less likely to have a negative opinion of labor regulations than firms that compete for customers 
in national or international markets. Naturally, this parallel is approximate and it fails to capture 
some features that are particular to international markets.  For instance, differences in regulatory 
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policies within countries are likely to be smaller than differences between countries.7  Therefore, 
size of the domestic market is a conservative indicator of the intensity of competition, in the 
sense that it captures a milder form of competition compared with that which stems from 
globalization. 
In addition, in developing countries, a particularly important source of competitive 
pressure not captured by the size of the market comes from the informal sector.  Informality has 
many dimensions, but a critical feature is that informal firms are largely unconstrained by 
regulations, rendering this form of competition conceptually similar to the type of undercutting 
competition envisioned by some globalization pessimists (in which firms face competitors from 
jurisdictions with lax standards).  Indeed, when enforcement is weak and compliance uneven, 
firms compete with other firms that do not meet the same regulatory standards even if they are 
located in the same jurisdiction.  Most developing countries have large informal sectors and 
many workers lack formal employment protections;8 in our sample of formal manufacturing 
establishments, 56% of employers report that they compete against firms in the informal sector. 
Those formal firms that contend with informal competition can be expected to face greater 
pressure to cut labor costs and, as result, may be more likely to hold a negative opinion towards 
regulations.  In short, while the globalization literature posits that international competition from 
                                                
 
7  There are other possible exceptions.  First, a firm that can benefit from economies of scale may be more 
productive when selling in a larger market than in a smaller one. In these instances, a firm that sells in a national 
market might face less competition than a firm that sells the exact same product in a smaller local market. Second, 
competition from a jurisdiction with high standards can lead to a “California Effect,” in which some firms prefer 
stronger regulations (Vogel 1995). Although this theory has been extended to labor regulations in international trade 
(Greenhill et al 2009), the original argument refers to product standards and requires firms to seek to enter a wealthy 
political jurisdiction that promotes strict standards.  Thus, labor politics in the domestic markets of developing 
countries is squarely outside the scope conditions for this theory.  
8 ILO. “Statistical update on employment in the informal economy” 2012  
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firms located in countries with lax regulations fuels the race to the bottom, domestically, the 
informal sector can play a similar role.  In sum, to test the mechanism that competitive pressures 
underlie opposition to labor regulations independently of trade and FDI, we examine the 
relationship between employers’ opinions and the size (i.e. geographic scope) of firms’ product 
markets as well as competition from the informal sector. 
By contrast, the optimistic view of globalization is underpinned, in part, by the idea that 
firms that export and have foreign capital tend to adopt production systems that prioritize more 
productive workers rather than lower labor costs.  These firms are often distinguished by the 
reliance on skilled workers; for example, Mosley argues that “the bulk of MNCs are concerned 
with the hiring and retention of skilled workers,” as opposed to the sole pursuit of lower labor 
costs (2010, p 53).  Consistent with the literature on advanced industrial countries, firms that rely 
on skilled workers may support regulations that allow employers to coordinate with employees 
so they can jointly invest and benefit from skills (Wood, 2001).9  Globalization optimists also 
suggest two pathways by which reliance on skill-intensive production systems may influence 
employer preferences: (1) the need to retain and attract skilled workers and (2) an alignment 
between the employment practices adopted by a firm and the requirements set forth by labor 
legislation.   
Consider the example of minimum wage regulations.  For firms that rely on low-cost, 
unskilled workers, wage floors are likely to conflict with their preferred employment practices, 
as they do not have to attract and retain skilled workers.  By contrast, employers who rely on 
                                                
 
9 Schneider (2013, p.106) has questioned whether labor regulation allows skilled workers and firms to coordinate in 
in Latin America. 
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skilled workers are likely to offer higher wages to attract and retain these workers, rendering 
minimum wages less of a constraint.  Another example can be found in legal requirements that 
limit the use of short-term labor contracts and require severance pay upon dismissal.  If given 
free reign, many employers would not provide workers with long-term contracts that reduce 
managers’ authority to hire and fire, and would not pay severance when they reduce the size of 
their workforces.  Indeed, employers have resisted these regulations in Brazil (Pires 2008), China 
(Kuruvilla, Lee, & Gallagher, 2011), and Indonesia (Amengual & Chirot, 2016).  Yet, firms that 
employ workers who learn skills on the job should incur distinct costs from these regulations 
than those that do not.  Quite simply, replacing workers who have acquired skills is likely to 
reduce productivity, giving employers less of an interest on short-term contracts.   Moreover, if 
firms seek to maintain a stable workforce, severance pay is less likely to be a substantial cost, as 
employers do not need to lay off workers and hire new ones as often.  For these reasons, the 
more a firm relies on skilled workers, the less likely it should be to oppose labor regulations.   
Qualitative studies of labor conditions in different industries and localities provide further 
evidence that reliance on skill-intensive production systems reduces the likelihood that 
employers in developing countries will object to the mandates of labor regulations. One example 
comes from a study of two Mexican exporting garment factories (Locke & Romis, 2010). One of 
these factories employed skilled workers as part of a bundle of practices designed to improve 
productivity, such as job rotation.  This factory sought to retain and reward its skilled workers for 
productivity and thus it was able to meet minimum labor standards with ease. In contrast, the 
other factory utilized low-skilled workers in a Taylorist system of production.  Its use of low-
skilled workers performing simple tasks decreased the cost of turnover and channeled managers’ 
attention towards ways to minimize labor costs.  Consequently, managers preferred human 
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resources practices clashed with labor regulations, which transformed compliance into a daily 
struggle and fueled resentment against labor regulations.    
Another example can be found in sugar and ethanol manufacturers in Brazil. Historically, 
most Brazilian sugar and ethanol mills hired a new set of unskilled production workers at the 
beginning of each harvest season, assigned them to either a day or night shift of 12 hours without 
interruption, and laid everyone off six or seven months later, once all the available sugarcane had 
been processed.  Naturally, these production practices clashed with many provisions of Brazilian 
labor law, including those pertaining to maximum allowed overtime, mandatory weekly rest, and 
safeguards against hazardous work. These firms also incurred significant costs to register all 
workers at the beginning of the season and pay mandatory severance packages later on. Not 
surprisingly, they either skirted the law (and faced the risk of punishment), or tried to comply 
and incurred extremely high costs without any offsetting benefit, such as higher productivity. In 
either case, managers’ reliance on unskilled workers set them on a collision course with the 
legislation and fueled bitter opposition to labor laws (Coslovsky, 2014).  Over time, some of 
these same firms adopted skill-intensive production systems that entailed higher wages and better 
working conditions that were naturally aligned with the mandates of labor regulations. Thus, 
firms employing skilled workers became less likely to find minimum wages or basic health and 
safety requirements onerous than those employing unskilled workers.   
In sum, both globalization optimists and pessimists presume that intensity of competition 
and the adoption of skill-intensive production systems underlie employers’ preferences for labor 
regulation.  Yet, these relationships have not been tested in developing countries, and this 
omission hinders our understanding of the factors that shape employers’ opinions. Thus, we 
advance two additional hypotheses:    
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H3: All else equal, employers facing more intense competition, from the informal sector 
or because they operate in larger markets, are more likely to have a negative opinion of 
labor regulation. 
 
H4: All else equal, employers in firms whose workforce include a higher proportion of 
skilled workers are more likely to have a positive opinion towards labor regulation. 
 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
To empirically examine, on one side, the relationship between trade, FDI, intensity of 
competition, and skills, and on the other, employers’ views of labor regulation, we draw upon the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES).10  In over 100 countries, these surveys are administered 
to a stratified random sample that is representative of private formal firms.11  To complete the 
survey, enumerators engage in face-to-face interviews with managing directors, accountants, 
human resource managers and other relevant company staff. At times, the enumerators interview 
more than one person to have a specialist for each area of the establishment. For simplicity’s 
sake, we refer to respondents as “employers” or “managers.”12  
                                                
 
10 The ES is just beginning to be used by political scientists.  For another application of these data, see Berliner and 
Prakash 2014.  The data have been used by economists, such as in La Porta and Shleifer (2014) who combine it with 
surveys of informal firms. 
11 The ES selects establishments in regions that contain the majority of economic activity.  The sampling procedure 
is as follows: first, enumerators identify all formal enterprises that have five or more employees, make independent 
financial decisions, have their own management, and control their payroll. Next, enumerators group all eligible firms 
into homogenous strata according to firm size, sector, and location. Finally, they randomly select enterprises from 
within each stratum. In most countries, most firms are of small and medium size but the large firms employ the 
majority of the people. To compensate for this difference, the ES oversamples large firms. When establishments 
refuse to participate or go out of business after they are selected, they are replaced with randomly selected 
substitutes from the same stratum. 
12 Establishment-level managers are appropriate respondents because they are attuned to the challenges of 
compliance.  However, the views of managers within firms can be heterogeneous, and there may be differences 
between the owners and managers. Such heterogeneity could result in firms sending contradictory signals to 
governments regarding regulation, and we may expect differences to be particularly pronounced for foreign-owned 
firms. We do not test predictions concerning the views of investors.  Unpacking the diversity of opinions between 
owners and managers, as well as within establishments, is beyond the scope of this article (See Gray & Silbey 
2014). 
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The ES contains data on “establishments,” which are distinct physical and administrative 
units of a firm (a single firm may have more than one establishment). While the ES covers both 
the service and manufacturing sectors, only the module designed for manufacturing 
establishments asks key questions related to worker skills.  For this reason, we restrict our 
analysis to formal establishments in the manufacturing sector.  This focus is appropriate because 
the theories being examined suggest that the forces of globalization, both positive and negative, 
are particularly strong among those that produce tradable goods. The focus on formal 
establishments is also propitious, as it assures that respondents are visible to the state and comply 
with some regulations (at the very least they are registered as legal entities).  After eliminating 
observations with missing data, we obtain a cross-section of approximately 19,000 employers 
located in 82 developing countries surveyed in or around the year 2010. We chose 2010 as our 
focal year because it allows us to maximize the number of observations while keeping the data 
recent. 13 To make sure that our results are not an artifact of the time period we study (during the 
Great Recession), we replicate the main analysis using data from earlier waves of the survey 
conducted in or around the year 2004 (see Table A8).  
To measure employers’ view of regulation, we use responses to the survey question: “To 
what degree are labor regulations an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” 
Permissible answers are: No Obstacle (0), Minor Obstacle (1), Moderate Obstacle (2), Major 
                                                
 
13 ES data are available over a number of years with repeated surveys for some countries, but there is no record of 
whether a firm was surveyed more than once as part of a specific country panel. As a result, the dataset is not a firm-
level panel, but rather a repeated cross-section. To convert the repeated cross-section into a simple cross-section, we 
chose the focal year or the most recent survey wave conducted in that country, immediately before or immediately 
after the focal year.  
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Obstacle (3), or Very Severe (4).   We use this original coding in our main analyses (in the 
Appendix Table A4 we report generalized ordered logit models showing the results at various 
cutoff points). Further, and as reported on the section devoted to robustness checks, we also 
analyzed an additional survey question that asks employers to identify the most important 
obstacle they face from a list of 15 possibilities.  
Despite the common assumption that employers universally oppose labor regulations, 
41% of managers indicate that labor regulations are not an obstacle for their establishment.  An 
equally large proportion of employers believe that labor regulations are either a “Minor” (22%) 
or “Moderate” (21%) obstacle. A comparatively small portion of employers describes labor 
regulations as a “Major” (10%) or “Very Severe” (5%) obstacle for their establishment. We do 
not take these answers as indicative of the labor conditions faced by employees of each surveyed 
establishment—managers that are forced to provide their workers with better labor conditions, in 
fact, might be more likely to resent regulations than managers who can act as they please.  Nor 
does this measure capture political action or lobbying against regulations. Rather, we take a 
narrower reading, and interpret employers’ answer that labor regulation creates obstacles for the 
operations of their establishment to mean that they hold negative opinions of regulations, which 
are important given the acceptance in the literature that firms influence policy, in part, to reduce 
the regulatory obstacles they face. 
An important aspect of this measure is that the survey question is phrased in a way that 
elicits opinion of de facto labor regulations, as faced by employers in a particular industry and 
country.  Therefore, we do not expect that an employer who operates in a context of permissive 
laws or lax enforcement will report that regulations are an obstacle based purely on ideological 
grounds. By contrast, an employer who is forced to comply against his or her will may be more 
likely to see regulations as an obstacle.  The sensitivity of our dependent variable to the lived 
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experience of respondents is an advantage of these data, as in much of the world there are 
substantial differences between de jure and de facto regulations (Caraway, 2009).  The 
alternative, of asking employers to articulate their general preferences towards regulation or 
deregulation unmoored from their lived experiences would rely on respondents’ ability to 
anticipate what it would be like to operate under distinct regulatory conditions.  By contrast, the 
contextualized nature of this question provides a measure of employers’ views in light of their 
experiences, making it ideal for adjudicating among the competing theoretical accounts that tie 
economic conditions to employers’ understanding of their own interests.  
To interrogate the hypotheses outlined above, we draw on a series of variables.  Export 
measures the percentage of output that the establishment exports.  FDI measures the percentage 
of the firm owned by foreign investors.14  We use two variables to measure the competitive 
pressure faced by an establishment.  The variable Competition from Informal Sector equals one if 
the employer self-reports that his or her establishment competes against informal firms.  The 
variable Non-Local Product equals zero if the employer reports that the “main market” for his or 
her establishment’s products is the same municipality where the establishment is located, or one, 
if the main market is either national or international.  To measure an establishment’s reliance on 
skilled workers, we use the percentage of production workers (Skilled Worker) described by 
management as having “some special knowledge or (usually acquired) ability in their work.”15  
                                                
 
14 As the differences between foreign firms and local firms / exporters and non-exporters is often treated more as a 
matter of kind than degree, we also created dummy variables for FDI and export with distinct cutoffs (>0%, >50%).  
The results of all the analyses are substantively unchanged.   
15 Unskilled production workers are those who do not have “special training, education, or skill to perform their 
job.”   
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This variable provides a contextualized measure of skills by drawing on the managers’ 
perception of what counts as special knowledge or ability. 
We also include a series of controls for variables that can potentially confound our 
analysis.  First, we control for Establishment Size, measured as the total number of full-time 
employees (thousands of permanent and temporary workers), as larger establishments may be 
more likely to attract enforcement or have more sophisticated human resource practices.  Second, 
we control for Labor Intensity of production, measured as labor cost divided by total production 
cost,16 as labor intensive firms may be particularly sensitive to any costs imposed by labor 
regulations.17  Third, we control for the percentage of workers with permanent contracts, 
Permanent, as an indicator of human resource practices; those establishments that choose to 
employ more permanent workers are more exposed to the costs of regulations, but may have 
done so voluntarily to minimize turnover, which may render them less likely to object to labor 
laws. 18  Fourth, some managers might just complain about everything; if that is the case, our 
measure of employers’ views towards labor regulation will capture general negativity rather than 
anything particular about labor regulation.  Fortunately, the ES dataset contains twelve separate 
but similarly worded questions about other obstacles—such as inadequate infrastructure, 
corruption, and taxes—that allow us to construct a baseline measure (Average Obstacles) of how 
much each employer complains overall.   
                                                
 
16 Labor cost includes wages, salaries, bonuses, etc. paid in previous fiscal year. Total production cost is the sum of 
costs of labor, electricity, communication, rent, raw materials and intermediate goods used in production, fuel, 
transportation, water, finished goods/materials bought to resell, rental of machinery, and other costs of production.  
17 See the citations within Mosley & Uno 2007, p. 941.  See also Murillo 2005. 
18 Permanent workers are “paid employees that are contracted for a term of one or more fiscal years and/or have a 
guaranteed renewal of their employment contract and that work up to 8 or more hours per day.”  
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To analyze these data, we use models with country fixed effects and dummy variables for 
eleven distinct manufacturing sectors,19 allowing us to focus on the establishment level variables 
that are central to the theoretical debates.20  In subsequent models, we include city fixed effects 
to control for differences in local labor markets and regulatory enforcement, as well as product 
fixed effects to address more fine-grained differences in what each establishment produces.  
While cross-sectional analyses do not support causal claims, the theoretical predictions that we 
examine do not imply unidirectional causation.  Rather, the theories we test predict that firms 
with particular characteristics differ systematically in their opinion towards labor regulation.  
Optimistic theories of globalization and labor politics predict that firms that receive FDI will 
have a more positive opinion of regulation than firms that rely exclusively on domestic capital, 
either because employers become more supportive of regulation after they receive FDI, or 
because FDI flows towards firms that support regulation.  Similarly, pessimistic theories of 
globalization predict that firms that export will have a more negative opinion of regulation than 
firms that sell mostly in the domestic market. Again, this relationship may emerge because 
employers who relentlessly try to decrease labor costs are more likely to export, or because 
exporters become especially sensitive to the burdens of regulation. In absence of an experimental 
design or a credible instrument, identifying the direction of causation is impossible and, more to 
the point, not our present goal.   
                                                
 
19 The sectors are: food; textiles; garments; chemicals; plastic & rubber; non-metallic mineral products; basic metals; 
fabricated metal products; machinery & equipment; electronics; and other manufacturing. 
 20 In the Appendix we include analyses of multilevel models that include country-level covariates to check whether 
the establishment-level variation is substantively important when compared to cross-country variation.  The results 
are congruent with the fixed-effects models.   
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Analysis 
Table 1 contains a series of OLS models with Obstacle as the dependent variable and 
with standard errors clustered at the city/town level.21 We first show simple models that only 
include one explanatory variable along with country, year, and industry dummies (Models 1-5).  
These preliminary analyses permit an assessment of whether the findings from the more 
complete models are robust to parsimonious specifications.  Reassuringly, coefficients of key 
variables in the parsimonious models are consistent with those of the more complete models, 
with the exception of FDI.  To discuss the results in detail, we draw on our preferred 
specification, Model 6, that includes basic controls.   
We find that employers whose establishments export more are substantially and 
statistically significantly more likely to perceive labor regulations as an obstacle (H1).  All else 
equal, moving from not exporting at all to exporting all output is associated with a 0.2 increase in 
the Obstacle variable.  This coefficient is equal to 17% of the mean of the dependent variable, 
revealing a substantive difference between firms that export and those that do not.  This finding 
is consistent with the pessimists’ prediction that employers exposed to global competition are 
more resistant to labor regulation.22  Turning to FDI, once we include controls, FDI is not 
associated with employers’ opinions.  Therefore, we do not find evidence for either the positive 
                                                
 
21 The results are substantively similar with clustering at the country level.  They are also similar when using an 
ordered logit model, but we choose not to present these results because the parallel regression assumption is 
violated.  A Brant test for proportionality of odds yields Chi-2 of 807.56, p<0.01 for a modified version of Model 6 
(without country fixed effects).  In the Appendix, Table A4, we include a Generalized Ordered Logit model that is 
appropriate for these data.  The results are consistent with the OLS models.   
22 Table A9 in the Appendix disaggregates establishments by the destination of their exports for a subset of the 
sample for which data are available.  Employers in establishments that export to the United States and Europe are 
also more likely to view labor regulation as an obstacle compared with firms that do not export.  
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association predicted by the optimists or the negative one suggested by pessimists (H2).  Still, 
this finding casts doubt on a critical mechanism that could account for the “climb to the top” 
dynamic between FDI and labor regulations observed by optimistic accounts of globalization.  
Specifically, if employers in foreign-invested firms were bringing “best practices” of labor rights 
that align with the prescriptions of regulation, these managers should be less likely to view 
regulation as an obstacle compared with employers of domestically-owned firms.   
To probe the relationship between FDI and managers’ opinions further, we separate 
foreign-owned firms into host "market oriented” and “export oriented” categories (Pandya 2010). 
Pessimistic theories tend to emphasize export oriented foreign-owned firms, such as a Korean-
owned garment producer located in Bangladesh and that sells its output in Europe.  These firms 
seek locations where production costs are low.  By contrast, optimistic theories tend to 
emphasize foreign-owned firms that are oriented towards host markets, such as a German-owned 
auto factory in Brazil that sells its cars to Brazilians.  These firms seek locations where they find 
favorable demand and not (only) low costs of production.  To test whether employers in these 
different types of firm hold different opinions towards labor regulation, we create dummy 
variables that separate establishments into four groups: foreign-invested establishments that 
export (FDI Exporters), foreign-invested establishments that sell domestically (FDI Domestic 
Sales), domestically-owned establishments that export (Domestic Owned Exporter), and 
domestically-owned firms that sell domestically (the omitted category).  The results (Model 9) 
show that employers who sell domestically have similar opinions independent on whether they 
are foreign or domestically-owned.  By contrast, the coefficients on all exporters, independent of 
ownership structure, are positive and statistically significant. Thus, even if we focus our attention 
on host market oriented firms, we do not find the relationships regarding employers’ views 
predicted by the optimists.   
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We now turn to measures of competition that rely on domestic differences in the contexts 
in which firms operate. We find evidence that employers in formal firms who compete with 
informal ones are more likely to perceive labor regulation as an obstacle (H3). This effect size, 
0.21, is 18% of the mean of the dependent variable.  The magnitude is similar to that of moving 
from not exporting at all to exporting all production, indicating that uneven playing fields are 
important determinants of employers’ views in developing countries.  In addition, employers 
whose establishments sell in national markets are more likely to find labor regulation an obstacle 
than those that sell exclusively in their own municipality.  While the effect size is small (only 6% 
of the mean of the dependent variable), this result provides further support for our finding that 
competitive pressures underlie negative opinions of labor regulation (H3).  In the Appendix 
(Table A7) we use the number of competitors as an alternative measure of the intensity of 
competition and find similar results.   
Finally, we turn to skills. The coefficient on the percentage of skilled workers employed 
by an establishment is negative and statistically significant (H4). The difference of having no 
skilled workers or all skilled workers is associated with a similar magnitude of effect as 
exporting, but in the opposite direction—the coefficient is -0.21, equal to 18% of the mean of the 
dependent variable.   This finding suggests that optimistic theories of globalization are correct to 
presume that employers whose establishments employ skilled workers are less likely to have a 
negative opinion of labor regulation, even in developing countries.  
Turning to the control variables, we find that employers in larger establishments are more 
likely to see labor regulations as an obstacle, which is congruent with the idea that bigger firms 
attract the attention of regulators and face more pressure to comply.  Employers that hire more 
workers through permanent contracts are less likely to perceive regulation as an obstacle, which 
is also consistent with the view that establishments adopting human resource practices that 
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emphasize retaining workers rather than reducing labor costs are less likely to view labor law 
negatively.  Somewhat surprisingly, labor intensity of production is not positively associated 
with viewing labor regulation as an obstacle.  This finding contradicts the conventional view that 
establishments with the greatest labor costs are more likely to have a negative opinion of labor 
regulation.23 Finally, in Model 8, we include the Average Obstacles variable, which measures 
general negativity and is highly correlated with our dependent variable.  Reassuringly, the 
coefficients on our key explanatory variables remain substantively unchanged.  This suggests 
that we are uncovering relationships specific to employers’ opinions of labor regulation, rather 
than employers’ overall propensity to complain. 
***  INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ***  
Robustness Checks 
 
One advantage of our dataset is that it allows us to focus on within-country differences 
among establishments and avoid using roughly measured country-level indicators of regulatory, 
political, and economic conditions that underpin much of the literature.24  However, conditions 
within countries can vary across a number of dimensions that could potentially confound our 
analyses.  To further control for this variation, we introduce OLS models with additional fixed 
effects in Table 2.25  First, cities and regions vary tremendously within countries.  Some regions 
may have more skilled or unskilled laborers, others might host more active or diligent regulatory 
                                                
 
23 It is congruent with trends in the garment industry in which employers temper their pursuit for low labor costs 
with a preference for particular types of labor control regime (Anner 2015).  
24 In the appendix, we draw on country-level data to use multi-level models to check whether establishment-level 
differences are important relative to cross-national differences.  Our results confirm that they are. 
25 We also undertook the same bivariate analyses as in Table 1 with the different combinations of fixed-effects.  The 
results are consistent with the complete models. 
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enforcement agencies, and labor laws (such as minimum wage) can vary by region as well.  
Therefore, in Model 10, we include fixed-effects for each of the 331 towns/cities where 
establishments are located.  Second, while in previous models we include country and industry 
dummies, in Models 11 and 12, we report the results of saturated models that include a dummy 
variable for each industry-country combination and industry-town/city combination.  In these 
models, we control for confounding factors arising from different sectors in different locations 
having varying underlying characteristics.  Finally, Model 13 includes a dummy variable for the 
main product of the establishment, coded using over 250 product categories (ISIC 4 digits).  This 
variable provides an even more fine-grained distinction across establishments than the 11 
industry codes we used before; in many instances, product codes distinguish establishments that 
produce finished goods from those that produce intermediate products within the same broad 
industry, which is important because an establishment that sells finished goods might face 
different competitive pressures than an establishment that sells intermediate products.  For 
example, this variable allows us to distinguish establishments that manufacture car parts from 
those that assemble cars.26  Across all these models, we find that the coefficients of all key 
variables remain statistically significant and in the expected direction. 
****  INSERT TABLE 2 HERE **** 
As an additional robustness check, we construct an alternative measure of employers’ 
views of labor regulation based on a separate survey question. When administering the survey, 
                                                
 
26 Unfortunately, the use of ISIC-4 product codes does not solve this matter entirely as they do not split all relevant 
categories (e.g. computer assembly versus parts manufacture), and therefore it does not allow us to locate the tier of 
all establishments in their respective value chains. For the full classification, see: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17  
 
 
29 
enumerators asked employers to consider fifteen “elements of the business environment” and to 
select the one that “currently represents the biggest obstacle faced by this establishment.” Using 
the responses to this question, we create a dichotomous variable (Labor Most) that equals one if 
the manager indicates that “labor regulation” is the biggest obstacle affecting the operation of his 
or her establishment.27  This question is advantageous because it captures the relative importance 
of labor regulation compared to other potential obstacles, such as corruption, trade regulations, 
and taxes. 28  Only 4.5% of managers in our sample see labor regulation as their most serious 
obstacle.  When the event rate is low, the conventional maximum likelihood method is 
vulnerable to small sample bias; therefore, we run standard OLS regressions, with fixed effects 
for country, industry, and year.29 Table 3 reports the results of these analyses.  First, with one 
exception, these parsimonious analyses reveal the same associations between all of our 
explanatory variables of interest and Labor Most as those in Table 1, thus providing additional 
support for the findings discussed above. The one exception concerns informal competition, as it 
has a statistically significant coefficient in the opposite direction as the analysis above.  We 
attribute this reversal to the fact that employers could choose “Practices of competitors in the 
informal sector” as the most serious obstacle that they face. This option is directly related to 
competition with informal firms; reasonably, managers who reported competing with the 
informal sector chose this response at very high rates, thereby reducing the likelihood that they 
                                                
 
27 The ES dataset only records the most serious obstacle reported by each respondent.  Therefore, we cannot identify 
respondents who would have selected labor regulations as one of the top three, or top five, or any other combination. 
28 The possible answers are: access to finance, access to land, business licensing and permits, corruption, courts, 
crime theft and disorder, customs and trade regulations, electricity, inadequately educated workforce, labor 
regulations, political instability, practices of competitors in the informal sector, tax administration, tax rates, 
transportation of goods supplies and inputs.  
29 The results are unchanged when using a rare events logit model.   
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place labor regulation at the top of the list.30  When we add the controls in Model 19, only the 
variables that have the strongest association with Obstacles in the analyses in Tables 1, 2 and 
3—Skilled Worker and Export—remain statistically significant.  The coefficients show that there 
is a 1.6% drop in the probability of an employer reporting that labor regulations are the most 
important obstacle if they employ skilled workers, and a 2.9% increase if they export.  These 
effect sizes are substantial given the small baseline proportion (4.5%) of employers reporting that 
labor regulations are the biggest obstacle they face.  While these results do not confirm all our 
previous findings, they lend further credence to our conclusions by showing the relationship 
between two theoretically important variables and a distinct and demanding measure of 
employers’ opinions.31  
*** INSERT TABLE 3 HERE *** 
 
CONCLUSION 
Labor regulations have tremendous social, economic, and political implications.  They set 
floors on health and safety, influence the quality of the work environment, restrict the types of 
legitimate employment contracts that can be used, and prescribe legal rights and duties for 
employers and workers that condition their power in the marketplace (Freeman, 2009).  Beyond 
these economic and social consequences, labor regulations also influence political outcomes; 
                                                
 
30 Among managers who report competing with the informal sector, 21% selected the “Practices of competitors in 
the informal sector” as their biggest obstacle out of the fifteen options, greater than any other option.  
31 These results are robust to the same saturated models reported in Table 2. 
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collective labor rights affect the power of organized labor and workers who are denied labor 
protections are less likely to vote or pay taxes (Ronconi & Zarazaga, 2015).   
Given these far-reaching consequences, scholars have sought to understand why 
countries adopt different labor laws, devote varying resources to enforcing them, and host firms 
that provide different labor conditions for their workers (Murillo, 2005; Anner, 2008; Caraway, 
2004; Schrank, 2009; Kuruvilla et al., 2011; Berliner et al., 2015b). Studies of labor politics 
acknowledge, either explicitly or implicitly, that employers play a crucial role in shaping the 
regulations that developing countries adopt and enforce.  Due to the centrality of employers, 
theories of globalization and labor politics often hinge on the ways economic variables translate 
into opposition to labor regulations.  Yet, the predictions of dominant theories for the opinions of 
employers have been unexamined.  
Our article provides and empirically tests an account of variation of employers’ views of 
labor regulation.  We find evidence consistent with the firm-level mechanisms of theories that 
argue that labor protections are incompatible with globalization as well as some, but not all, of 
the firm-level mechanisms of those who argue that trade and foreign investment can push labor 
standards up.  The association between exporting and employers being more negative towards 
labor regulation conforms to the way pessimists deduce the political views of employers.  
Politicians and regulators in jurisdictions where many firms export are more likely to face 
employers who have a negative opinion of labor laws, thereby making it more challenging for 
them to adopt and enforce protective regulations.  Thus, we show evidence congruent with the 
microfoundations of theories relating trade to the erosion of labor regulations through the actions 
of employers.  This result has direct implications for our understanding of the ways in which 
trade openness may influence labor policy.  While trade may diffuse better labor practices and 
exporters might offer higher wages and be more productive than non-exporters, our analysis 
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shows that exporters nevertheless hold more negative opinions regarding labor regulation.  This 
suggests that the competitive pressures unleashed by exposure to foreign trade may create 
political obstacles to adopting and enforcing labor regulation.   
Our findings with regard to FDI do not show that employers in foreign-invested firms 
have a more positive opinion towards labor regulation, as predicted in the optimistic literature.  
Overall, we uncover little evidence congruent with the argument that foreign-invested firms are 
likely to offer political support for stronger worker protections.  Although we do not challenge 
the core findings of country-level studies that link FDI to more protective labor regulations, the 
contrast between our finding on FDI and optimistic accounts of globalization raises important 
and unresolved questions about the mechanisms underlying these theories. If managers in 
establishments receiving FDI do not support labor regulation any more than domestically-owned 
establishments do, what is driving the ‘climb to the top’ dynamic?  Future research will have to 
discover alternative mechanisms to account for the relationships between FDI and labor 
regulations.  
Although we cast doubt on the firm-level pathways proposed by globalization optimists, 
we find support for the mechanisms that both pessimists and optimists assume underlie variation 
in employers’ views towards labor regulation.  Our results show that employers facing more 
competitive pressures because they sell in national markets or compete against informal firms are 
indeed more likely to hold a negative view of labor regulations.  Both findings support the view 
highlighted by the pessimists that competition fuels negative opinions of regulation.  We also 
find that firms that employ a higher portion of skilled workers are less likely to object to labor 
regulation.  This finding is congruent with research on advanced industrial countries showing 
that firms’ positions towards labor policy depend on their production systems, especially their 
reliance on skilled workers.  The finding suggest that, in developing countries, efforts to upgrade 
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firms’ production systems, so that they utilize more skilled labor, may have both political and 
economic effects, as these employers have more positive opinions towards labor regulations.  
One strength of our empirical analysis is the combination of employer-level observations 
with wide coverage of the data that allows us to dialogue with the cross-national literature 
theorizing the average effect of globalization on labor politics.  However, the cross-sectional 
nature of our data prevents us from tracing the processes that lead employers to shift their views 
about labor regulations, and our focus on the average relationship clearly masks substantial 
heterogeneity across countries and industries.  Future studies will be needed to determine 
whether, for example, changes in trade openness or shifts in supply chains that result in 
upskilling factories induce employers to shift their preferences.  As these relationships are likely 
to depend on institutional configurations that change from country to country and sector to 
sector, studies focused on particular sectors and countries will be necessary.  Moreover, by 
investigating employers’ declared views of their firms’ interests, we leave open the question of 
how employers’ opinions affect labor law, enforcement, and working conditions on the ground.  
Given the state of the literature, we have good reasons to believe that politicians often act to 
adjust regulation in ways that meet the interests of firms, but more research is needed to 
understand the conditions under which politicians are more or less likely to do so.  Future 
research will also have to link employers’ opinions to their actual behaviors to construct a 
complete account of the role of firms in labor politics.  This paper provides a necessary, but until 
now overlooked, first step; only by gaining an understanding of which employers perceive labor 
regulations as congruent or incongruent with their interests can we discover how they form 
preferences, and how and when their preferences become policy.   
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TABLES 
Table 1: Negative Opinion of Labor Regulation  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
Skilled Worker -0.232***     -0.210*** -0.211*** -0.177*** -0.207*** 
 (0.03)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.0347) Export  0.233***    0.238*** 0.220*** 0.181***  
  (0.04)    (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  FDI   0.0671**   0.0247 0.0191 0.0297  
   (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  Non-Local Product    0.116***  0.0827*** 0.0783*** 0.0470** 0.0610** 
    (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0291) 
Competition from Informal Sector     0.189*** 0.216*** 0.213*** 0.0947*** 0.214*** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0314) 
Establishment Size       0.0367** 0.0351** 0.0283 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.0237) Permanent       -0.233*** -0.110** -0.232*** 
       (0.06) (0.05) (0.0583) Labor Intensity       0.00885 0.0488 0.0257 
       (0.04) (0.04) (0.0428) Average Obstacles        0.651***  
        (0.02)  FDI Exporter         0.211*** 
         (0.0340) 
FDI Domestic Sales         -0.0170 
         (0.0444) 
Domestic Owned Exporter         0.190*** 
         (0.0242) 
Constant 0.818*** 0.636*** 0.661*** 0.625*** 0.595*** 0.654*** 0.869*** 0.366*** 0.821*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.0668) R-squared 0.255 0.255 0.252 0.254 0.257 0.265 0.267 0.391 0.269 
Observations 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 
Dependent variable is Obstacle.  OLS models, with country, sector, and year dummies included in all models.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at city in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2: Saturated, City, and Product Fixed-Effects Models 
Independent Variables  M10  
M11 
 
M12 
 
M13 
  
 
Skilled Worker -0.198*** -0.206*** -0.195*** -0.208***  
 (0.0358) (0.0336) (0.0388) (0.033)  
Export 0.236*** 0.201*** 0.229*** 0.224***  
 (0.0351) (0.0368) (0.0392) (0.0367)  
FDI 0.0122 0.0207 0.0112 0.0192  
 (0.0302) (0.0312) (0.0327) (0.0298)  
Non-Local Product 0.0806*** 0.0757*** 0.0723*** 0.0834***  
 (0.0191) (0.0216) (0.0207) (0.0203)  
Competition from Informal  0.203*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.211***  
Sector (0.0211) (0.0223) (0.0217) (0.0233)  
Establishment Size 0.0311* 0.0335* 0.0280 0.0396**  
 (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0187)  
Permanent -0.246*** -0.233*** -0.276*** -0.261***  
 (0.0496) (0.0548) (0.0541) (0.0571)  
Labor Intensity 0.0281 0.00997 0.0373 -0.00907  
 (0.0391) (0.0415) (0.0438) (0.0396)  
Constant 1.121*** 0.592* 1.097*** 2.796***  
 (0.0737) (0.341) (0.174) (0.105)  
Country Dummies N N N Y  
City Dummies Y N N N  
Industry Dummies Y N N N  
Product Dummies N N N Y  
Country x Industry N Y N N  
City x Industry N N Y N  
Observations 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,811  
R-squared 0.298 0.293 0.362 0.271  
  
Dependent variable Obstacle.  Robust standard errors clustered at city level in parentheses.  Year dummies included 
in all models.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
  
 
 
40 
Table 3: Likelihood of Selecting Labor Regulation as Most Important Obstacle 
 
Independent Variables  M14 M15 M16 M17 M18 M19 
       
Skilled Worker  -0.0173***     -0.0159*** 
 (0.01)     (0.01) 
Export   0.0356***    0.0290*** 
  (0.01)    (0.01) 
FDI   0.0142**   0.003 
   (0.01)   (0.005) 
Non-Local Product     0.0103**  0.003 
    (0.00)  (0.003) 
Competition from      -0.00674** -0.003 
Informal Sector     (0.00) (0.003) 
Establishment Size      0.00695** 
(1000 People)      (0.004) 
Permanent      -0.004 
      (0.01) 
Labor Intensity       0.003 
      (0.06) 
Constant 0.0803*** 0.0642*** 0.0675*** 0.0652*** 0.0717*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,282 
R-squared 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.06 
OLS regressions, with Labor Most as dependent variable.  Country, year, and industry fixed effects are included in 
all analyses.  Robust standard errors clustered at the city level in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics32 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Obstacle 1.16 1.21 0 4 
Skilled Worker 0.66 0.32 0 1 
Export 0.15 0.29 0 1 
FDI 0.1 0.28 0 1 
FDI Domestic Sales 0.03 0.18 0 1 
FDI Exporter 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Domestic Owned Exporter 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Domestic Owned  Domestic Sales  0.63 0.48 0 1 
Non-Local Product 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Competition from Informal Sector 0.56 0.5 0 1 
Establishment Size (1000 People) 0.16 0.6 0.001 30.1 
Permanent 0.89 0.18 0 1 
Labor Intensity 0.33 0.24 0 1 
Average Obstacles 1.38 0.84 0 4 
Labor Most 0.04 0.21 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
32 N=19,282.  In our sample, 36% of the enterprises are small (less than 20 employees), 37% are medium-sized 
(between 20 and 99 employees), and 27% are large (more than 100 employees). In terms of geography, 25.6% are 
located in Africa and the Middle East, 15.1% in South and Eastern Asia/Pacific, 21.5% in Europe and Central Asia, 
and 38% in Latin America and the Caribbean.  A full list of countries is in Table A3.  During the visits, enumerators 
assess the likely accuracy of responses whose values can be measured objectively, such as productivity and 
employment numbers. In our sample, 36% of these responses are “taken directly from establishment records,” 58% 
are “computed with some precision,” and only 6% seem to be “arbitrary and unreliable.”   
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Table A2: Correlation Matrix  
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Obstacle 1           
2. Skilled Worker -0.08*** 1          
3. Export 0.02* 0 1         
4. FDI 0.01 0.02** 0.27*** 1        
5. Non-Local 
Product 
0.04*** -0.08*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 1       
6. Competition 
from Informal 
Sector 
0.15*** -0.05*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.09*** 1      
7. Establishment 
Size (1000 
People) 
0.02** -0.02*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.05*** 1     
8. Permanent -0.03*** -0.02* -0.05*** -0.01 0 -0.05*** -0.02* 1    
9. Labor 
Intensity 
-0.02*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06*** 0 -0.01 0.04*** 1   
10. Average 
Obstacles 
0.50*** 0.01* -0.05*** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.18*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02* 1  
11. Labor Most 0.28*** -0.04*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0 0.03*** 0 0 -0.01 1 
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Table A3: Countries Included 
 
Country/Year # of Obs. Country/Year # of Obs. Country/Year # of Obs. 
Afghanistan 2008 98 Jamaica 2010 70 Turkey 2008 657 
Albania 2013 76 Jordan 2013 124 Uganda 2013 237 
Angola 2010 118 Kazakhstan 2009 134 Ukraine 2008 348 
Argentina 2010 653 Kenya 2013 288 Uruguay 2010 253 
Armenia 2009 91 Kosovo 2009 55 Uzbekistan 2008 119 
Azerbaijan 2009 106 Kyrgyz Republic 2009 83 Venezuela 2010 61 
Belarus 2008 55 Latvia 2009 72 Vietnam 2009 703 
Bolivia 2010 57 Lebanon 2013 152 Yemen 2010 194 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 94 Lithuania 2009 71 Zambia 2013 230 
Botswana 2010 76 Madagascar 2009 174 Zimbabwe 2011 310 
Brazil 2009 718 Mali 2010 51   
Bulgaria 2009 53 Mauritius 2009 116   
Burkina Faso 2009 70 Mexico 2010 1,032   
Cameroon 2009 104 Moldova 2009 91   
Chile 2010 647 Mongolia 2009 122   
China 2012 1,535 Montenegro 2009 21   
Colombia 2010 612 Mozambique 2007 341   
Costa Rica 2010 251 Myanmar 2014 327   
Cote d Ivoire 2009 125 Nepal 2009 123   
Croatia 2007 272 Nicaragua 2010 103   
Czech Republic 2009 55 Panama 2010 56   
DRC 2010 106 Paraguay 2010 91   
Djibouti 2013 10 Peru 2010 643   
Dominican Republic 2010 100 Philippines 2009 779   
Ecuador 2010 103 Poland 2009 87   
El Salvador 2010 103 Romania 2009 91   
Estonia 2009 73 Russia 2009 435   
Ethiopia 2011 111 Senegal 2007 259   
Fyr Macedonia 2009 102 Serbia 2009 127   
Georgia 2008 97 Slovak Republic 2009 48   
Ghana 2013 202 Slovenia 2009 86   
Guatemala 2010 242 South Africa 2007 677   
Honduras 2010 106 Sri Lanka 2011 283   
Hungary 2009 87 Tajikistan 2008 99   
Indonesia 2009 870 Tanzania 2013 188   
Iraq 2011 392 Trinidad & Tobago 2010 101   
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Generalized Ordered Logit Model 
 
To further investigate the non-linear nature of the dependent variable, we use a 
generalized ordered logit model in Table A4.  Each column gives the log odds of a respondents 
viewing labor regulation “above” a particular threshold.  For example, the first column provides 
the log odds of a respondents viewing labor regulation as any obstacle (Obstacle=1, 2, 3, or 4) 
versus viewing labor regulation as no obstacle (Obstacle=0); the second column gives the log 
odds of a respondent viewing labor regulation as a moderate, major, or very severe obstacle 
(Obstacle=2, 3, or 4) versus viewing labor regulation as no or minor obstacle (Obstacle=0 or 1), 
and so on.  For the variables Skilled Worker, Export, and Competition with the Informal Sector, 
the coefficients are similarly signed across all levels.  Thus, these results are entirely consistent 
with the OLS models.  For Non-Local Product, coefficients are only significant below “Major 
Obstacle,” (Obstacle =3) suggesting that the size of the domestic market is only related to 
moving from no objection to negative opinions, but not the intensity of the negative opinions.  
Interestingly, this analysis reveals that FDI is positively associated with moves from “No 
Obstacle” to “Minor Obstacle,” but negatively associated with viewing labor regulation as a 
“Major Obstacle.”  While the overall effect of FDI remains ambiguous, this result provides 
further evidence that employers in foreign-invested firms are unlikely to hold  positive opinions 
(as indicated by declaring that labor regulation is not an obstacle) than we would expect if these 
firms favored greater labor protections as optimistic theories argue.  
 
Table A4: Generalized Ordered Logit Model 
Independent Variables  Minor Obstacle  Moderate Obstacle  Major Obstacle  Severe Obstacle  
Skilled Worker -0.443*** -0.412*** -0.329***  -0.261** 
 (0.0906) (0.0733) (0.083) (0.106) 
Export 0.321*** 0.501*** 0.489*** 0.309* 
 (0.0782) (0.0776) (0.088) (0.179) 
FDI 0.179** 0.009 -0.147* -0.095 
 (0.0721) (0.071) (.0883) (0.137) 
Non-Local Product 0.174*** 0.162*** 0.047 0.045 
 (0.056) 0.0534 (0.049) (0.079) 
Competition  0.365*** 0.454*** 0 .447*** 0. 463*** 
from Informal Sector (0.058) (0.049) 0 .0502 (0.084) 
Establishment Size 0.077** .087* 0.0069 -0.177 
(1000 people) (0.0414) (0.048) (0.047) (0.114) 
Permanent -0.399*** -0.413** -0.494** -0.147 
 (0.138) (0.131) (0.15) (0.233) 
Labor Intensity -0.0231 0.047 0.109 0.059 
 (0.095) (0.086) (0.104) (0.179) 
Constant -0.0476 -1.268*** -2.19*** -4.38*** 
  (0.169)  (0.20)  (0.235)  (0.733) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors, clustered at city level, in parentheses. Country, sector, and 
year fixed effects.  Pseudo R-squared 0.13. N=19,282; N of countries=82. 
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Balancing 
 
 One concern with the analysis is that exporting firms tend to be different than non-
exporting firms, in that they are larger, more productive, and more likely to have foreign capital.  
While balancing and matching cannot eliminate the problem of omitted variable bias, by 
preprocessing the data with matching we can reduce problems of imbalance between exporters 
and non-exporters, as well as model dependency. Below, we present the results of our main 
analysis after we pre-processed the data using entropy balancing.  Entropy balancing reweights 
the “control group” (i.e. non-exporting firms) to ensure these establishments match the moments 
of the “treatment group” (i.e. exporting firms).33  We prefer entropy balancing over other pre-
processing methods such as propensity score matching because entropy balancing does not 
discard observations: all information in our data set is preserved which enhances subsequent 
analyses.34  As Table A5 makes clear, before balancing exporting firms as a group tend to be 
larger, have more foreign investment, and are less often subjected to competition from the 
informal sector than non-exporting firms.  After balancing, the means and variance of most 
covariates are identical (Table A5; the mean for Obstacles is 1.09 for establishments that do not 
export and 1.32 for those that do, a statistically significant difference (F=27.05, p<0.01). In 
Table A6, we run the same Model 8 from Table 1 on the balanced data.  The results show that 
the coefficient on exporting remains statistically significant and in the positive direction.  
  
                                                
 
33 We create a dummy variable, Export Dummy, that equals 1 if the establishment exports any of its production.  We 
ran the analysis with the cutoff at 50% of the establishment’s production, and the results are the same. 
34 Hainmueller, Jens. "Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting Method to Produce 
Balanced Samples in Observational Studies." Political Analysis 20 (2012): 25-46. 
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Table A5: Entropy Balancing on Export 
 
Panel 1: Before Balancing 
  
Export 
Mean 
Export 
Variance 
Export 
Skewness 
Non-
Export 
Mean 
Non-
Export 
Variance 
Non-
Export 
Skewness 
Skilled Worker 0.64 0.10 -0.43 0.68 0.11 -0.60 
FDI 0.19 0.13 1.58 0.05 0.04 4.16 
Non-Local Product 0.84 0.13 -1.86 0.49 0.25 0.06 
Competition from 
Informal Sector 0.47 0.25 0.11 0.60 0.24 -0.40 
Establishment Size 
(1000 People) 0.31 0.77 13.11 0.08 0.13 50.32 
Permanent 0.89 0.03 -2.07 0.90 0.03 -2.02 
Labor Intensity 0.32 0.06 1.04 0.34 0.06 0.82 
Average Obstacles 1.39 0.68 0.32 1.37 0.73 0.36 
 
Panel 2: After Balancing 
 
  
Export 
Mean 
Export 
Variance 
Export 
Skewness 
Non-
Export 
Mean 
Non-
Export 
Variance 
Non-
Export 
Skewness 
Skilled Worker 0.64 0.10 -0.43 0.64 0.11 -0.41 
FDI 0.19 0.13 1.58 0.19 0.14 1.59 
Non-Local Product 0.84 0.13 -1.86 0.83 0.14 -1.80 
Competition from 
Informal Sector 0.47 0.25 0.11 0.47 0.25 0.10 
Establishment Size 
(1000 People) 0.31 0.77 13.11 0.31 5.57 12.18 
Permanent 0.89 0.03 -2.07 0.89 0.04 -1.88 
Labor Intensity 0.32 0.06 1.04 0.32 0.06 0.95 
Average Obstacles 1.39 0.68 0.32 1.39 0.73 0.30 
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Table A6: Obstacle with Balanced Data on Export 
 
Independent Variables MA1 
  Skilled Worker -0.163*** 
 (0.0335) Export  0.198*** 
 (0.0326) FDI 0.00570 
 (0.0321) Non-Local Product 0.00559 
 (0.0188) Competition from Informal Sector 0.132*** 
 (0.0240) Establishment Size (1000 workers) 0.00315 
 (0.00507) Permanent -0.120** 
 (0.0593) Labor Intensity 0.0308 
 (0.0419) Average Obstacles 0.637*** 
 (0.0187) Constant 0.542*** 
 (0.0714)   Observations 19,282 
R-squared -0.163*** 
Robust standard errors clustered at city-level in parentheses.   
Year, country, and sector dummy variables included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Alternative Measure of Competitive Intensity 
 
Our primary measures of intensity of competition are (i) whether the establishment sells 
its products to national or municipal markets, and (ii) whether the establishment competes 
against firms in the informal sector.  The ES survey provides an additional question that allows 
us to measure this concept through different means.  Specifically, the survey asked each 
employer: “For the last fiscal year, for the main market in which this establishment sold its main 
product, how many competitors did this establishment’s main product/product line face?  The 
options range from none, one, 2-5, and more than five.  Drawing from these answers, we create a 
dummy variable that equals one when the response is more than five, separating out those 
establishments that face very little competitors from those that face many competitors.  
Unfortunately, there are many missing values, so the N drops to approximately 13,000 
establishments in 68 countries.  Analyzing the results in Table A7, we find that this measure of 
competitive intensity is positively associated with employers viewing labor regulation as an 
obstacle.  
 
 
Table A7: Obstacle with Alternative Competition Measure 
 
Independent Variables MA2 MA3 
   Skilled Worker  -0.204*** 
  (0.0382) Export   0.370*** 
  (0.0778) FDI  0.0387 
  (0.0417) Competition from Informal Sector  0.208*** 
  (0.0274) Establishment Size (1000 workers)  0.0483 
  (0.0371) Permanent  -0.280*** 
  (0.0652) Labor Intensity  0.00679 
  (0.0442) More than Five Competitors  0.0894*** 0.0617*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0223) Constant 0.591*** 0.878*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0891) 
   Observations 12,798 12,798 
R-squared 0.274 0.286 
Robust standard errors clustered at city-level in parentheses.   
Year, country, and sector dummy variables included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Analysis of an Earlier Round of Enterprise Survey Data 
 
The paper presents cross-sectional data for surveys completed in or around 2010, at the height of 
the Great Recession.  As a robustness check, we use data from earlier survey waves, centered on 
2004, to replicate our analysis.  This sample contains data on an additional 16,500 employers in 
83 countries (these is no overlap between these data and the data we use in the main analysis). 
There are four main differences in the survey questions. First, there are no questions that allow 
us to recreate the Non-Local Product variable.  Second, the survey does not ask employers whether 
their firms compete against the informal sector. Rather, it asks whether “Anti-competitive or 
informal practices” is an obstacle (on a 0-4 scale). Third, the survey does not include a question 
that would allow us to recreate the Labor Most variable. Fourth, the survey does not include data 
on the city in which establishments are located. The rest of the variables approximate those that 
we used in the main analysis.  
 
Table A8 contains analyses with Obstacle as the dependent variable.  We run a series of OLS 
models with country, year, and industry fixed effects, and with standard errors clustered at 
country level.  Just as in Table 2, we first show simple models that only include one explanatory 
variable along with country, year, and industry dummies (Models 1-4). In Model 5, we control 
for the size of enterprise and percentage of workers with permanent contracts. Model 6 controls 
for Average Obstacle, which is the mean of managers’ perception about other obstacles.  
 
With two exceptions, the coefficients of key variables remain significant and in the same 
direction as reported on our analysis in Table 1; exporting and informal competition are 
associated with negative opinions of labor regulation, while reliance on a skilled workforce is 
associated with more positive opinions. One difference from the models in Table 2 is that 
informal competition is no longer significant when the Average Obstacles variable is included, 
an unsurprising result due to the fact that these variables are high correlated with one another 
(0.65).  A second difference in this period concerns FDI, which is associated with negative 
opinions of labor regulation.  Although the effect size is small, this result casts further doubt on 
the firm-level mechanism suggested by globalization optimists.  
  
 
 
51 
Table A8: Negative Opinion of Labor Regulation Using Earlier Wave of ES (2002-2006) 
 
VARIABLES MA4 MA5 MA6 MA7 MA8 MA9 
       
Skilled Worker -0.0895***    -0.0787*** -0.0622*** 
 (0.0287)    (0.0251) (0.0210) 
Export   0.162***   0.172*** 0.109*** 
  (0.0488)   (0.0455) (0.0255) 
FDI   0.0961***  0.0679** 0.0725*** 
   (0.0330)  (0.0286) (0.0232) 
Informal Competition35     0.201*** 0.206*** 0.0172 
   (0.0225) (0.0218) (0.0105) 
Size (1000 workers )      0.0606*** 0.0383*** 
     (0.0153) (0.0117) 
Permanent      -0.0621 -0.0542 
     (0.0480) (0.0406) 
Average Obstacles       0.879*** 
      (0.0365) 
Constant 1.225*** 1.147*** 1.152*** 0.912*** 0.943*** -0.505*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0244) (0.0248) (0.0305) (0.0539) (0.0761) 
       
Observations 16,531 16,531 16,531 16,531 16,531 16,531 
R-squared 0.348 0.349 0.348 0.382 0.388 0.527 
Dependent variable is Obstacle.  OLS models, with country, industry, and year dummies included in all models.  
Robust standard errors clustered at country in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
                                                
 
35 Informal Competition measures the severity of anti-competitive or informal practices as an obstacle on a five 
point scale where 0 if no obstacle, 4 if very severe obstacle. 
 
 
52 
Export Destination and Bilateral Trade / FDI Context  
A set of recent articles (Greenhill et al., 2009, Adolph et al., 2017) has argued that the influence 
of trade on labor politics depends on the country’s trading partners.   Specifically, these authors 
argue that countries’ labor practices improve when their firms trade with countries that have 
stronger labor protections.  Conversely, countries’ labor practices worsen when their firms trade 
with countries that have weaker labor protections.  Like most of the literature, these studies rely 
exclusively on country-level analyses, but their authors discuss both firm- and country-level 
mechanisms. According to these articles, firms that export to countries with stronger labor 
protections should improve their practices and, ultimately, pull up labor regulations and 
practices.   
 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the trading partners for each and every establishment in 
our main sample so we cannot test the hypotheses suggested by these two papers.   However, a 
set of Enterprise Surveys conducted in Latin America in 2006 asked managers for the “primary 
destination” of their establishment’s main product.  Using responses to this question, we create 
two variables: (1) Export Developed is a dummy variable for those establishments that export to 
the United States, Canada, or Europe (7% of the sample), and (2) Export Developing is a dummy 
variable for those that export to Asia, Africa, or Latin America (also 7% of the sample). The 
omitted category represents establishments that primarily sell to domestic markets.  Thus, these 
data allows us to investigate whether, at the firm level, there is indeed a difference in opinions 
among managers depending on the main export destination of their goods.  We test the following 
two hypotheses:  
 
HA1: Employers in developing country firms that mainly sell their products to developed 
country markets should have a more positive view of labor regulation than firms that 
mainly sell their products domestically.  
 
HA2: Employers in developing country firms that mainly sell their products to developing 
country markets should have a more negative view of labor regulation than firms that 
mainly sell their products domestically. 
 
We seek to approximate the model in Table 1 as closely as possible, but too many observations 
for the variable Informal Competition are missing, so we do not include it in the analysis.  
Instead, we use the variable Informal Obstacle based on a question that asked respondents to 
assess how great of an obstacle is competition from the informal sector.   After removing 
observations with missing values, we obtain a dataset that contains ~4,300 formal manufacturing 
establishments located in 14 countries.36  The results are presented in Table A9.  Models A10 
and MA11 use Obstacle as a dependent variable, and A14 and A15 use Labor Most as a 
                                                
 
36 Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay.   
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dependent variable.  The results provide some support HA2, but clearly falsify HA1. We take 
these results with caution because they are confined to a particular region – Latin America – 
where we also find the highest rates of negative opinions towards labor regulation.  Yet the 
similarity between the opinions of firms that export to developing countries and our overall 
findings suggests that our lack of information about export destinations does not invalidate our 
main result.  Note that, in this regression, FDI has a very small association with more positive 
views of labor regulation, suggesting that while the average effect of FDI is null throughout the 
world, there are places where FDI inflows are indeed associated with managers not seeing labor 
regulations as an obstacle. 
 
Table A9: Export Destination and Employers’ Opinions of Labor Regulation in Latin America 
 
 MA10 MA11 MA12 
 Obstacle Obstacle Labor Most 
    
Skilled Worker -0.175*** -0.122** -0.00730 
 (0.0555) (0.0502) (0.00988) 
Export Developed 0.298*** 0.164*** 0.0481** 
 (0.0660) (0.0613) (0.0201) 
Export Developing 0.184** 0.0905 -0.00338 
 (0.0744) (0.0727) (0.0177) 
FDI -0.00136* -0.00157** -0.000344*** 
 (0.000728) (0.000654) (0.000125) 
Non-Local Product -0.0170 -0.0167 -0.00669 
 (0.0397) (0.0374) (0.00668) 
Informal Obstacle 0.138*** 0.0196 -0.000616 
 (0.0162) (0.0150) (0.00253) 
Size 0.0220 0.0331 0.0222** 
 (0.0292) (0.0258) (0.00960) 
Labor Costs 0.225** 0.267*** 0.000372 
 (0.0931) (0.0985) (0.0178) 
Perm -0.0473 -0.0178 -0.00164 
 (0.0671) (0.0656) (0.0117) 
Average Obstacles  0.672***  
  (0.0261)  
Constant 2.078*** 1.086*** 0.163*** 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.0254) 
Observations 4,354 4,354 4,375 
R-squared 0.202 0.324 0.056 
Robust standard clustered at town level in errors in parentheses. 
Fixed effects for country and industry included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To further probe the idea that the effect of trade on employers’ opinions depends on whether they 
trade “up” or trade “down”, we combine country-level export data (from the IMF, following 
Greenhill et al 2009) with country-level human rights data compiled by CIRI (and used by 
Berliner 2015a and Adolph et al 2017) to calculate an export-weighted average of labor rights for 
a country’s export partners in a given year.37 To be clear, CIRI data are extremely coarse, as the 
variable can take only three values (0, 1, and 2, from least protective to most protective of labor 
rights).  Following Greenhill et al (2009), we then calculate the bilateral trade context as:  
 
 !"#$%&'$#	)'$*&	+,-%&.%/0 = 2$3,'	'"4ℎ%67078 × :.;,'%/70),%$#	&.;,'%6/0 
 
Where Exportijt is the volume of exports from country i to country j in year t; Total exportsit are 
the total volume of exports from countryi to its destinations in year t; Labor rightsjt is the labor 
rights score of country j in year t.  Thus, Bilateral Trade Contextit is the export-weighted average 
of labor rights across country i’s export partners in year t.  
 
We then split our sample into countries whose bilateral trade context in year t is above the 
median and those below median.  The results, Table A9, show that direction of the relationship 
between export and manager’s perception of labor regulation is the same in both subsamples, 
indicating that even in countries where the literature suggests labor laws and practices are being 
pulled up by trade, exporters themselves are more likely to have negative opinions of labor 
regulation than employers who do not export.     
 
Although no prior studies (to our knowledge) have made similar claims regarding FDI, it is 
reasonable to expect that the source of FDI also influences the effect of globalization.  If that is 
the case, the null result on FDI that we find might be an artifact of our analysis, as it does not 
separate capital that flows from countries that uphold strict labor standards from capital that 
flows from countries that do not uphold strict labor standards.  
 
Given that our firm-level dataset does not identify the country of origin of an establishment’s 
foreign investors, we take the same approach as with trade. More specifically, we combine 
                                                
 
37 This variable indicates the extent to which workers enjoy rights of freedom of association at workplaces and 
collective bargaining, and other internationally recognized rights at work, including a prohibition on the use of any 
form of forced,  compulsory labor, or child labor, acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, 
work hour, and occupational safety and health.   
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UNCTAD data on FDI flows and stocks with CIRI data on human rights of investing countries to 
calculate bilateral context for FDI inflows and stock for each receiving country in our sample.38   
 !"#$%&'$#	<=>	>-?#,@	+,-%&.%/0 = 2$3,'	'"4ℎ%67078 × <=>	"-?#,@7/0),%$#	<=>	"-?#,@/0 
 !"#$%&'$#	<=>	>-6%,AB	+,-%&.%/0 = 2$3,'	'"4ℎ%67078 × <=>	"-6%,AB7/0),%$#	<=>	"-6%,AB	/0 
 
Where FDI inflow (instock) jit is the volume of FDI inflow (instock) from country j to country i 
in year t; Total FDI inflow (instock)it are the total volume of FDI inflow (instock) in countryi in 
year t. Bilateral FDI inflow (instock) it is the FDI inflow (instock)-weighted average of labor 
rights across country i’s FDI origin countries in year t.  
 
We split the sample between countries below and above the median of each bilateral FDI context 
variable.  Our results show that FDI has no association with employer views of labor regulation 
even in countries whose FDI inflow or in-stock includes a larger share of countries with higher 
labor rights scores than the median.   
 
	
  
                                                
 
38 Bilateral FDI inflow and in-stock data is from UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics.  
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx  
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Table A10: Split Sample on Bilateral Trade and FDI Context 
	
 (MA13) (MA14) (MA15) (MA16) (MA17) (MA18) 
 Bilateral 
Trade 
Context 
Below 
Median  
Labor 
Standards 
Bilateral 
Trade 
Context 
Above 
Median 
Labor 
Standards 
Bilateral 
FDI In-
Stock 
Context 
Below 
Median 
Labor 
Standards 
Bilateral 
FDI In-
Stock 
Context 
Above 
Median 
Labor 
Standards 
Bilateral 
FDI Inflow 
Context 
Above 
Median 
Labor 
Standards 
Bilateral 
FDI Inflow 
Context 
Below 
Median 
Labor 
Standards 
 
       
Skilled Worker -0.214*** -0.197** -0.176*** -0.247*** -0.156*** -0.226*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0777) (0.0464) (0.0468) (0.0505) (0.0438) 
Export 0.219*** 0.222*** 0.234*** 0.207*** 0.195*** 0.220*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0841) (0.0475) (0.0551) (0.0616) (0.0432) 
FDI 0.000111 0.0499 0.0470 -0.0115 0.0626 -0.00837 
 (0.0340) (0.0599) (0.0448) (0.0423) (0.0643) (0.0313) 
Non-Local Product 0.0575** 0.137*** 0.0623* 0.0942*** 0.100** 0.0644*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0436) (0.0322) (0.0290) (0.0419) (0.0239) 
Competition from 
Informal Sector 
0.216*** 0.214*** 0.169*** 0.261*** 0.0708** 0.281*** 
(0.0247) (0.0523) (0.0325) (0.0322) (0.0333) (0.0285) 
Establishment Size 0.0231 0.126*** 0.0286 0.0630* 0.119*** 0.0156 
 (0.0173) (0.0394) (0.0190) (0.0329) (0.0382) (0.0168) 
Permanent -0.210*** -0.323*** -0.206*** -0.271*** -0.208** -0.268*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0889) (0.0768) (0.0736) (0.0844) (0.0694) 
Labor Intensity 0.00499 0.0364 -0.0842 0.108** -0.0195 0.0159 
 (0.0457) (0.0804) (0.0583) (0.0504) (0.0753) (0.0465) 
Constant 0.444*** 0.903*** 0.741*** 0.896*** 0.818*** 0.921*** 
 (0.113) (0.139) (0.138) (0.100) (0.134) (0.0889) 
       
Observations 14,359 4,923 9,951 9,331 6,379 12,903 
R-squared 0.294 0.180 0.311 0.193 0.212 0.283 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city.  Country, year, and industry fixed-effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Multilevel model 
 
The models with country fixed-effects that we discuss in the main body of this paper 
control for cross-country heterogeneity, but they cannot estimate level effects of differences 
across countries, such as the content of labor laws. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) 
shows that there are indeed important differences across countries; the ICC shows that 19% of 
the variation occurs at the country level.  Therefore, in the following analysis we explicitly 
model the effects of country level variables. To do so, we combine the ES with country-level 
data from a variety of sources.  For labor regulation, we draw on data from the World Bank 
Doing Business (DB) Project, which has been collecting data on labor regulations around the 
world since 2006.  The DB data provide measures of a number of specific aspects of labor law. 
We include a variable that measures limits on the use of temporary contracts (Max Duration), 
measured by the maximum cumulative duration of a fixed-term employment relationship (in 
months) including all renewals39; the shorter the limit, the stricter the regulation.  Second, we 
include severance pay (Severance), measured as the number of weeks of pay the employer owes 
a worker who is dismissed after 10 or 20 years of employment.40  Third, we include a dummy 
variable indicating whether third-party approval is required for laying off one (or more) 
redundant workers (Approval).  Fourth, we use a dummy variable indicating restrictions of 
overtime work (No Overtime). This variable equals one if the work week for a single worker 
cannot be extended to 50 hours per week for two months each year to respond to a seasonal 
increase in production. Fifth, we include notice period for redundancy dismissal (in weeks) after 
the worker has been employed continuously for 10 or 20 years (Notice).41  Finally, we 
constructed an index (Regulation Index) that combines 18 measures of individual labor 
regulations, including indicators on difficulty of hiring, rigidity of work hours, difficulty of 
firing, and firing cost.  The index ranges from 0-1, with 1 being the strictest regulation; details on 
how we constructed this measure are available in Table A10.  This index only includes labor 
laws pertaining to individual workers’ rights (and not collective labor rights). One important 
limitation of this index, and the separate measures of labor laws described above, is that they 
capture laws-on-the-books, and not the law-in-practice. Due to the large and varying gap 
between de jure and de facto regulations in developing countries, de jure measures only 
incompletely capture the differences across countries. We expect that this measurement error 
should decrease the likelihood of detecting a relationship between laws and employers’ views. 
 
Beyond the content of regulations, we also include a set of country-level variables that 
could influence managers’ views towards labor regulation.  To reduce problems of measurement 
                                                
 
39 The maximum value of Max Duration in our sample is 120 months.  If a fixed-term employment relationship can 
be renewed indefinitely (i.e. no limit), we assume Max Duration is 240 months.   
40 The period is 20 years for 2006-2009 surveys, and 10 years for 2010-2014 surveys. The maximum value of 
Severance in our sample is 130 weeks’ pay.  If the law does not allow for redundancy dismissal we assume 
Severance is 150 weeks’ pay.  
41 The period is 20 years for 2006-2009 surveys, and 10 years for 2010-2014 surveys. The maximum value of Notice 
in our sample is 13 weeks. If the law does not allow for redundancy dismissal, we assume Notice is 30 weeks.  
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error and missing values in specific years, for all of these variables, we use the average of the 
available data over five years ending with the year of the survey.  First, to measure the level of 
global integration at the country level, we use net inflows of FDI measured as a percentage of 
GDP (FDI Inflow) and total trade (the sum of imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP 
(Trade).  We obtain both of these measures from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicator (WDI) database. Second, we include a measure of Democracy, as countries that are 
more democratic have substantially different labor politics and often are more protective of 
workers (Mosley and Uno 2007), using data from the Polity IV. Third, leftist or labor-backed 
political parties tend to support protective labor regulations (Murillo and Schrank 2005; Murillo 
2005) and enforcement (Ronconi 2012; Berliner et al. 2015b).  To account for the ideology of the 
government, we include the variable Power of the Left, drawn from the Database of Political 
Institution, which equals one, if a leftist party holds the executive office, or zero, otherwise.  
Finally, we control for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in current US dollars, drawn from 
World Bank WDI (Log GDP), and the unemployment rate drawn from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) (Unemployment).   
 
Models A19 and A17 include both national- and establishment-level data.  After 
controlling for establishment-level variables, the ICC decreases to 13%, indicating that some of 
the between country variance is due to firm-level factors being unevenly distributed across 
countries. Overall, the country-level variables explain only a small amount of the variance in 
employers’ opinions. Examining the results in detail, when countries have stricter labor laws, its 
employers are more likely to have a negative opinion of regulation.  To contrast the size of the 
effects, one standard deviation increase on the Regulation Index (i.e. more stringent laws) is 
associated with a 0.08 increase in the predicted value of the Obstacle variable (i.e. more 
complaints)., A move from employing no skilled workers to all skilled workers is associated with 
a 0.19 decrease in the predicted value of the Obstacle variable. Finally, a move from not 
exporting to exporting all output is associated with an increase in 0.22 in the predicted value of 
the Obstacle variable. When we include labor laws individually, only approval of layoffs 
(Approval) and Notice are positively associated with negative opinions.  Surprisingly, severance 
pay is negatively associated with negative opinions. 
 
Employers in countries that have higher GDP per capita are more likely to have negative 
opinions of labor regulations.  And employers in countries governed by left leaning executives 
are more likely to view regulation negatively.  This finding is consistent with studies on labor 
politics that suggest that political ideology influences enforcement (Berliner et al. 2015b).  
Unemployment is negatively associated with employers responding that labor regulations are an 
obstacle.  We find no association between levels of democracy and employers’ views.   
 
Turning to country-level measures of globalization, we find negative coefficients for both 
trade and FDI.  Both findings allow for multiple interpretations.  For trade, one possibility is that 
establishments in these countries face less enforcement, which we cannot measure independently 
(Ronconi 2012).    For FDI, however, this is unlikely because countries that receive FDI enhance, 
rather than reduce, enforcement (Ronconi 2012).  Another possibility is that FDI and trade 
tighten labor markets in the manufacturing sector in developing countries.  While establishments 
that receive FDI or export their output have to reduce costs to please foreign investors, their 
neighboring establishments must devise ways to attract and retain workers in a tighter labor 
market.  As a result, this latter category of firms may be more likely to offer labor conditions that 
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are aligned with the mandates of labor laws.  The differing results for country- and 
establishment-level variables show the importance of analyzing micro-level data that can directly 
speak to the theoretical mechanisms underlying theories of globalization and labor politics.  It 
would be incorrect to infer from the negative coefficient on country-level exports that individual 
establishments that export have more favorable opinion towards labor regulation. As reported in 
the main body of the paper, our firm-level data shows that the opposite is true. 
 
Table A11: Multilevel Models  
 
Independent Variables  MA19 MA20 
Establishment-Level 
  Skilled Worker -0.191*** -0.192*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Export 0.222*** 0.222*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
FDI 0.014 0.013 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-Local Product 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Competition from Informal Sector  0.227*** 0.227*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Establishment Size(1000 People)  0.065*** 0.065*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Permanent -0.174*** -0.175*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Labor Intensity 0 0.001 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Country-Level   
  Log GDP 0.152*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Trade -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
0.00 0.00 
FDI Inflow -0.029*** -0.027** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Power of the Left 0.451*** 0.397*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Unemployment -0.018** -0.017** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Democracy 0.01 0.003 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Max Duration 0 
 
 
(0.00) 
 Severance -0.002* 
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(0.00) 
 No overtime 0.12 
 
 
(0.19) 
 Approval  0.272** 
 
 
(0.11) 
 Notice 0.022*** 
 
 
(0.01) 
 Regulation Index 
 
0.436** 
  
(0.22) 
Constant -0.011 -0.416 
 
(0.38) (0.37) 
Random Effects  
  
   
   Variance of country-level error  0.078*** 0.090*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) 
   Variance of enterprise-level error 1.144*** 1.144*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.  Multilevel linear models with Obstacle as the dependent variable. Number of 
establishments = 15,729; number of countries = 67.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Sector and year fixed effects 
included in all models. 
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Table A12: Descriptive Statistics of Country-Level Variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Log GDP 80 7.97 1.14 5.70 10.03 
Trade 78 85.44 30.38 25.39 156.74 
FDI Inflow 80 5.27 4.27 -0.11 24.11 
Power of Left42 75 0.31 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Unemployment 79 9.06 5.77 2.34 34.84 
Democracy43 73 5.13 5.36 -9.00 10.00 
Max Duration 82 140.05 101.86 12.00 240.00 
Severance 82 34.35 34.55 0.00 150.00 
No overtime 82 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Approval  82 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Notice 82 6.61 5.82 0.00 30.00 
Regulation Index 82 0.32 0.19 0.01 1.00 
 
  
                                                
 
42 The data source of Power of the Left data goes from 2002-2012, but our samples range from 2007-2013. There are 
1840 out of 16,799 establishments surveyed in 2013 (located in eight countries). Power of the Left for these 
establishments are measured as the average of observations from 2008 to 2012. 
 
43 Countries are rated from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). 
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Table A13: Labor Regulation Index 
Variable  Description  
Difficulty of Hiring 
Indicators  
The difficulty of hiring index measures the flexibility of contracts and the 
cost of hiring: (1) a country is assigned a score of 1 if the fixed term contracts 
are prohibited for permanent tasks; (2) a score of 1 is assigned if the 
maximum cumulative duration of a fixed-term employment relationship, 
including all renewals, is less than 3 years, 0.5 if 3 years or more but less than 
5 years, and 0 if fixed term contracts can last 5 years or more. The difficulty 
of hiring index is the average of 2 values and scaled to 1.  
Rigidity of Work Hours 
Indicators  
The rigidity of work hours index measures the extent to which employers and 
workers accommodate/allow scheduling of nonstandard work hours and 
annual paid leave. It has five components: (1) a country is assigned a score of 
1 if the workweek for a single worker cannot be extended to 50 hours per 
week (including overtime) for 2 months each year to respond to a seasonal 
increase in production; (2) a country is assigned a score of 1 if there are 
restrictions on night work; (3) a country is assigned a score of 1 if there are 
restrictions on “weekly holiday” work”; (4) a score of 1 is assigned if the 
maximum number of working days per week is 5 days or less;  (5) a score of 
1 is assigned if the mandatory working days of annual leave (i.e. vacation) 
with pay after 20 years of continuous employment for 2006-2009 (or 10 years 
for 2010-2014) is more than 21 days. Averaging the five dummy indicators 
and scaling the result to 1 gives a final index of rigidity of work hours.  
Difficulty of Firing 
Indicators   
The difficulty of firing index has 8 components: (1) whether it is illegal for an 
employer to terminate the employment contract of a worker on the basis of 
redundancy; (2) whether the employer must notify a third party before 
dismissing one redundant worker; (3) whether the employer needs the 
approval of a third party in order to dismiss one redundant worker; (4) 
whether the employer must notify or consult a third party prior to a collective 
dismissal; (5) whether the employer must obtain prior approval from a third 
party before a collective dismissal; (6) whether there is a retraining or 
reassignment obligation before an employer can make a worker redundant; 
(7) whether there are priority rules that apply to redundancy dismissals or lay-
offs; (8) whether there are priority rules applying to re-employment. 
Questions (1) and (3) are the most restrictive regulations and so are assigned 
greater weight. An answer of “no” for question (1) gives a score of 10, and 
the remaining questions do not apply. An answer of “yes” for question (3) 
gives a score of 2.  For other questions, if the answer is “yes”, a score of 1 is 
assigned. Adding the scores and scaling to 1 gives a final index of difficulty 
of firing.  
Firing Cost Indicators   
The firing cost index involves notice requirement, severance pay, and 
penalties for redundancy dismissal, expressed in weeks of salary. Adding the 
scores and scaling to 1 gives a final index of firing cost.  
Labor Regulation Index  
The labor regulation index is the average of the difficulty of hiring index, 
rigidity of work hour index, difficulty of firing index, and firing cost index. 
The labor regulation index is scaled to 1.  
 
 
 
